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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of a public research and development (R&D) subsidy
to private firms in Mexico. My estimates suggest that the subsidy has a positive im-
pact on personnel allocated to innovation activities, but it does not have an effect on
stronger measures of R&D performance, such as research personnel, patents or private
R&D spending. I argue that awarded firms would have performed their planned R&D
projects in case they were not granted the public funds. Additional public funds seem
to be invested to allocate more personnel on already planned projects, but not to carry
out additional ones. Specifically, I analyse the Programa de Est´ımulos a la Innovacio´n
(PEI) subsidy. The program’s rules set a grade threshold below which no R&D projects
get the grants and above which some projects are granted. This granting process allows
to use a fuzzy regression discontinuity approach to identify causal inference.
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1 Introduction
A widely used policy to promote private research and development (R&D) is to directly
subsidize private firms. This policy is mostly used in high income countries, as they count
with more public resources to support R&D activities. However, in the last decades some
middle income countries have put this policy in place. The effectiveness of public subsidies
to promote private R&D may differ according to the economic context. These subsidies
may be ineffective in middle or low income countries for many reasons. For instance, when
faced with problems that require R&D, firms in middle income countries may chose to adopt
solutions already developed in countries at the technology frontier, instead of investing in
their own R&D. In addition, firms in middle or low income countries may find it problematic
to hire highly qualified personnel or to acquire research equipment.
My paper studies the impacts of a public R&D subsidy on private R&D activities in
Mexico, a middle income country. Previous research on the impact of R&D subsidies focuses
almost exclusively on high income countries. Those studies mostly find that R&D subsidies
have positive effects on private R&D, or that, at least, firms do not decrease their private
R&D spending as they receive the public funds, allowing them to incurr in aditional R&D
activities with the subsidy money.1 I know of just one study –by O¨zc¸elik and Taymaz (2008)
in Turkey– that analyses the impacts of R&D subsidies in a non-high income country. It
finds positive effects of R&D subsidies, but just in small size companies. So, my research
builds on previous literature, firstly by providing more evidence on the effects of public R&D
subsidies in countries far from the technology frontier.
My estimates suggest that the subsidy leads firms to allocate more personnel to innova-
tion activities. However, I do not find evidence of impacts on the other outcomes I analyse:
research personnel, patenting activities and private R&D spending. In this paper, innovation
1The paper by Becker (2015) reviews extensively previous literature on the effects of R&D subsidies.
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is defined as the creation of new products that may come from well defined projects or from
non-systematic work, such as spontaneous ideas. While research is defined as systematic
work that increases knowledge and results in the creation of new products. Innovation is
the weakest of the R&D outcomes I review, as it does not require carrying-out systematic
R&D work. I argue that, on average, subsidy receiving firms would have carried-out their
planned R&D projects even in the absence of the public grants. In case firms receive the
subsidy, the additional public resources seem to be invested in allocating more personnel in
the already planned R&D projects, but not on carrying-out additional ones. This additional
innovation personnel does not result in increased patenting activities in the subsidized firms.
My research also builds on previous literature by estimating the effect of R&D subsidies
on more outcomes other than private R&D spending. These outcomes are not covered in
most reserach on R&D subsidies.2 Including more outcomes in the analysis, gives a better
understanding of the channels through which the policy may operate.
Specifically, in this paper I study the effect of Programa de Est´ımulos a la Innovacio´n
(PEI), a R&D subsidy granted by Mexico’s Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnolog´ıa
(CONACYT). Until year 2018, PEI was CONACYT’s largest R&D subsidy to private fims.
Then, the federal goverment that took office on December 1, 2018 decided to cancel further
grants from the program. Companies that applied to the PEI subsidy had to submit at
least one R&D project following guidelines clearly defined by CONACYT. The program’s
rules specified that submitted projects were graded on a 0 to 110 point scale by three dif-
ferent evaluators mostly independent from CONACYT. None of the projects graded below
75 points were granted the subsidy. Projects graded with 75 points or more were passed
to a CONACYT evaluation committee. Among these projects, the committee chose the
ones to award based on the evaluators assessments. This granting process allows to use the
regression discontinuity design (RDD). The RDD method is based on the assumption that
2Papers by Czarnitzki and Licht (2006), Hussinger (2008) and Bronzini and Iachini (2014) analyse more
outcomes additional to private R&D spending but their results are not uniformly conclusive.
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firms just below and just above the threshold are similar and only differ by the fact that
those above the threshold receive the PEI subsidy. This quasi-experimental setting deals
with the problem of sample election bias and allows to get casual inference from the esti-
mates. Since not all firms above the threshold are granted, I follow the fuzzy RDD method,
which consists of two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions. In the first stage, I regress
subsidy reception on the grade. And in the second stage, I regress the outcomes on the first
stage predicted subsidy reception.3 Previous research on the effects of R&D subsidies on
private R&D mostly rely on estimation techniques that select on observables to deal with
the selection bias problem. So, this paper also contributes to previous literature by taking
advantage of the quasi-experimental setting offered by the PEI granting rules, allowing to
infer causality more transparently.4
This paper relies on two sets of data. The first is administrative data on the PEI subsidy.
This dataset is not publicly available. It was provided to me by CONACYT personnel. To
my knowledge, this dataset has not been previously used for impact evaluation analysis. It
contains information on 6,369 R&D projects submitted to the PEI program by 2,845 firms
from 2011 to 2013. The second source of data is the 2014 Economic Census collected by
Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica y Geograf´ıa (INEGI). The census datasets provide infor-
mation on firm outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I present a summary of
previous research on the impacts of public R&D subsidies. Then, Section 3 gives a general
description of the R&D context in Mexico and presents the PEI subsidy in detail. Section
4 describes the data I use in this research and explains the methodology. Section 5 shows
3Bronzini and Iachini (2014) use a similar approach for Italian R&D subisides. However, they apply
sharp RDD to their estimates, as all firms above the Italian threshold are granted with the subsidy. A
detailed description of regression discontinuity estimation can be found in work by Jacob et al. (2012) and
Cattaneo et al. (2019).
4Other authors that make use of a quasi-experimental setting to analyse the impacts of R&D subisidies
are Lach (2002), Cerulli and Poti (2012) and Bronzini and Iachini (2014).
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tests that support the methodology and presents the results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Research and development (R&D) activities are credited for having positive spillover effects
on the economy, particulaly on productivity.5 However, as Becker (2015) points-out, private
R&D spending exhibits a classic public goods problem: private firms do not appropriate
completely the returns of their own R&D investment as some of the benefits are absorbed by
other economic agents.6 The presence of both positive impacts of R&D and private returns
being lower than the social optimum, provide the the classical argument in favour of public
support of R&D activities. In particular, it is argued that governments could subsidize pri-
vate firms’ R&D projects so total R&D investment moves closer to the social optimum. A
different argument in favor of government support of private R&D concerns the risky nature
of these activities.7 Financial constraints for R&D activities are high as private borrowers
tend to be less prone to finance them. Public funding of R&D might encourage private firms
to invest more heavily in these activities by decreasing financial constraints.
The arugments in favour of government support of R&D activities in private firms are
solid. Yet, the earliest studies on the effect of public R&D subsidies on private R&D got
ambivalent conclusions on the effectiveness of this policy. David et al. (2000) present an
overview of literature on the subject from the 1960s to the 1990s. About half of the 19
firm-level studies they review report that direct R&D subsidies have crowding-out effects on
private R&D spending, i.e. firms decrease their private R&D expenditure when they receive
the subsidies. This early work bears some shortcomings. First, it relies heavily on US data
5See the firm-level research by O’Mahony and Vecchi (2009) in the US, UK, Japan, Germany and France;
the industry-level study by Cameron et al. (2005) in the United Kingdom; and the country-level study by
Bravo-Ortega and Garca Mar´ın (2011).
6Evidence of this problem is provided by Griliches (1979).
7Research by Hyytinen and Toivanen (2005) and Czarnitzki (2006) indicates that investment in R&D
activities is riskier than investment in physical assets.
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–about half the studies concern the US–, so it ignores the particular contexts that may arise
in other countries. In addition, early studies neglect the problem of sample selection bias, as
most of them use ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation in the absence of an experimental
or quasi-experimental setting. So, these studies do not face the typical endogeneity problem
present in impact evaluation research. Among other concerns, R&D intensive firms may
be more likely to apply for –and be granted with– R&D subsidies. In this context, OLS
estimates might be biased, tending to overestimate the subsidies’ crowding-out effects.
Recent literature employs other econometric techniques, such as matching or instrumen-
tal variables, to address the sample selection bias problem. This literature gets estimations
that point to complementarity effects of public R&D subsidies on private R&D activities,
putting the policy in a more favorable light. Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) and Czarnitzki
and Licht (2006) examine these subsidies in Germany and find that public R&D support
leads to an increase in private firm R&D activities.8 A different study by Carboni (2011)
focuses on manufacturing Italian firms in the 2001-2003 time span. The author finds that
R&D subsidies to private firms increase private R&D spending. In addition, subsidized firms
tend to take on more credit to invest in R&D. The author interpets this as evidence that
public funding alleviates credit constraints faced by the risky nature of R&D spending. In a
different study, Aerts and Schmidt (2008) study public R&D subsidies in Flanders and Ger-
many in the 2002-2004 period. They find that subsidies increase private R&D expenditure.
The authors argue that finding similar results in two different countries gives robustness to
their findings.9
Additional research finds positive effects of direct subsidies on private R&D activities for
8The authors suggest that firms in Estearn Germany are more responisive to public funding because
other sources of R&D funding are scarce compared to the west. However, Western German firms are more
succesfull when it comes to patenting results. This may be due to the largest expertise of firms in the west
in carrying-out R&D activities: they can translate funding more effectively into patents.
9Other studies that find crowding-in effects of R&D subsidies on private R&D spending are those of
Bloch and Graversen (2012) in Denmark and Hussinger (2008) in Germany.
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subsets of receiving firms. Lach (2002) examines direct R&D subsidies in Israel and finds
no statistically significant effect on all receiving firms. However, small subsidy receiving
firms significantly increase their private R&D investments. The author suggests that large
subsidized firms would have performed the R&D projects in the absence of public support.
Whereas, public funding for small firms is escencial for them to take on R&D activities. A
similar conclusion is reached by Bronzini and Iachini (2014). They investigate R&D subsidies
in Italy a find that small subsidy receiving companies increase their own R&D expenditure
by approximately the same amount of the subsidy. They find no effect for the whole sample
of subsidy receiving firms. In Turkey, O¨zc¸elik and Taymaz (2008) find that R&D subsidies
have a larger effect small firms. Becker and Hall (2013) analyse these subsidies in the United
Kingdom. They find that granted firms in low technology sectors increase private R&D
expenditures, while firms in high technology sectors do not.
Finally, there is a set of research on R&D subsidies that does not find complementarity
effects on private R&D activities, but it does not find crowding-out either. Duguet (2004)
analyzes public R&D subsidies to private firms in France and concludes that they have no
effect on the growth rate of firm’s R&D spending to sales ratio. Gonza´lez et al. (2005) and
Gonza´lez and Pazo´ (2008) analyze R&D subsidies in Spain. They both find that subsidies
have no impact on private R&D spending, i.e. firms would continue to perform the same
R&D projects in the absence of public funds. Cerulli and Poti (2012) estimate the impact of
R&D subisidies on Italian firms. They do not find either crowding-out or crowding-in effects
from the subsidies in various subsets of awarded firms.
Therefore, recent research finds that public R&D subsidies lead private firms to either
increase their R&D activities, or do not affect them at all. Evidence for crowding-out, i.e.
displacement of private R&D due to public subsidies is scarce in the latest studies. Still,
an important caveat remains: this line of research remains almost exclusively performed in
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high income countries. Appart from that, even the latest studies present a methodological
problem: they rely heavily on estimation methods that select on observables. Studies that
use an experimental or quasi-experimental setting are scarce.
3 R&D Spending in Mexico
R&D activities are commonly defined as the work that leads to increasing knowledge, and
using such knowledge to create new products, services or applications (OECD, 2015). In
Mexico, R&D spending amounted to 0.48 percent of GDP in year 2017. This rate remained
somewhat stable in the previous decade, ranging from 0.43 to 0.54 percent of GDP. Most
of the country’s R&D spending comes from the public sector –around 60 to 70 percent of
the total depending on the year–. Private for-profit firms contribute with around 20 per-
cent, while universities and non-for-profit organizations spend the rest (CONACYT, 2017).
Mexico’s expenditure on R&D is slightly below the Latin American mean of 0.55 percent of
GDP. However, it is considerably lower than Brazil’s, the region leader, at 1.28 percent of
GDP (in 2014). Moreover, compared to high income countries, Mexico’s R&D spending is
quite low: the average for OECD countries stands at 2.35 percent of GDP. South Korea and
Japan show the largest shares at 4.24 and 3.14 percent respectively, far from Mexico’s 0.48
percent (OECD, 2018). For most OECD countries, R&D spending mostly comes from the
private sector, as opposed to many Latin American countries, where the largest share comes
from public sources.
In Mexico, the largest source of R&D public funding is Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y
Tecnolog´ıa (CONACYT), the agency in charge of most federal government public policies
on research, science and technology. In 2017, it spent 46 percent of all federal government’s
R&D expenditure, vastly outpacing federal public universities, the second largest contrib-
utors, at 28 percent of the total. This makes CONACYT the biggest contributor to R&D
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spending, not only in the federal government, but the whole country.10 In year 2015, CONA-
CYT’s main disbursements went to: 1) its own research centres, which in 2015 got close to
30 percent of the agency’s budget, 2) scholarships for graduate students with around 20
percent, 3) a program targeted to increase Mexico’s researchers productivity with nearly
10 percent, and 4) subsidies to private firm’s R&D projects with close to 15 percent of the
budget (CONACYT, 2017).
In order to significantly increase Mexico’s total R&D spending, it seems likely that not
only public sources should rise, but also private ones, as is the case in countries with higher
R&D/GDP shares. So, this research is relevant for Mexico’s context and that of countries
with similar economies. If private firms are not meaningfully impacted by public R&D
subsidies, then government agencies like CONACYT might find it more practical to divest
funds to different types of programs to increase total R&D investments.
3.1 The PEI Subsidy
CONACYT’s largest fund granting R&D subsidies to private firms is Programa de Est´ımulos
a la Innovacio´n (PEI).11 In 2015, it awarded 4,054 million MXN (255 million USD) to 821
projects. In 2009, the year it was created, PEI granted 2,365 million MXN (175 million USD)
to 503 projects.12 This amounts to a 71 percent growth in money granted in that time span.
The government that took office in December 1, 2018 decided to cancel new allocations to
PEI and greatly diminished transfers to other funds that granted subsidies to private firms.
The new administration argues that it is unacceptable that public resources are transferred
to private firms when R&D funds are scarce. It states that R&D funds have more beneficial
10In 2017, Mexico’s federal government alloted 61,154 million MXN (3,235 million USD) to R&D spdend-
ing. CONACYT spent 28,181 million MXN (1,486 million USD) on R&D, amounting to 0.13 percent of the
country’s GDP. For more information, see CONACYT (2017).
11Apart from the PEI program, CONACYT granted R&D subsidies to private firms mainly with two
other programs: 1) the “mixed founds”, which were operated by CONACYT and its local counterparts
in the country’s States (and a few cities); and 2) the “sectoral funds”, which were managed jointly by
CONACYT and a federal ministry.
12MXN amounts are presented at constant 2018 prices.
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impacts when they are transferred to other entities such as public research institutions or
universities.13 This research may shed light on the usefulness of the decision to cancel the
PEI program.
Companies that wished to apply to PEI’s grants had to be legally constituted, registered
with the tax authority and up-to-date with their tax obligations (i.e. informal firms were
not eligible). To receive the grant, companies had to submit a R&D project to CONACYT
defining clearly the research and development activities to be undertaken with the subsidy.
PEI grants could only be spent in the submitted project.14 A company could submit more
than one project to PEI’s grants. Moreover, more than one project per company could
be financed in the same calendar year. However, projects already financed by a different
CONACYT program –including those of CONACYT partnerships– could not be submitted
to PEI. This effectively ruled out most of the other available public R&D funds in Mexico.
To qualify for the subsidy, companies had to finance a part of the R&D project with their
own resources.15
All projects submitted to PEI’s grants were graded by three different evaluators chosen
from a directory of CONACYT official evaluators. Evaluators were usually academics, sci-
entists or researchers affiliated to universities or research centers. They were typically not
directly hired by CONACYT but could collaborate with the agency on other projects. The
evaluation was performed according to a guide provided by CONACYT. The grade could go
13See the press conference on June 27, 2019 by CONACYT director Mar´ıa Elena A´lvarez-Bullya
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i5cYvoXEzGM.
14Firms could chose to partner their R&D project with a research center or university. The PEI grant
could finance expenditures performed on the project by the research partner and by the company itself. The
grant had to be spent on the calendar year it was awarded.
15The minimum share that companies needed to finance varied depending on the size of the firm and
whether the project was linked with a research institution or not. It could go from 35 to 75 percent of the
project’s total value. In addition, there was a maximum limit on the amount to be granted by the PEI
subsidy. The maximum amount varied according to company size and cosponsoring with a research center.
In year 2013, this maximum amount went from 21 million MXN (1.6 million USD) to 36 million MXN (2.81
million USD).
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from 0 to 110 points. The minimum grade required for the project to be considered candidate
for a grant was 75 over 110 points. All projects marked 75 points and above were sent to a
CONACYT evaluation committee. This committee chose the projects to be awarded based
on the assessments made by the evaluators and the information contained in the submitted
documents describing the project. Not all projects graded above 75/110 got the grant. The
committee could have used criteria other than the project grade –as long as it was above
the 75-point threshold– to decide which projects to award. However, as shown in Section
5, the grade was a good predictor of the granting decision, which is essential for my esti-
mation strategy. Each project final grade was the mean grade given by the three different
evaluators. Both submitting firms and evaluators were aware of the 75/110 grade threshold
as rules are clearly described in publicly available documents describing the program.16 I
discuss concerns that this might bring to my estimation strategy in Section 4.2.
4 Data and Methodology
4.1 Data
This research relies mainly on two sets of data. The first one is an administrative dataset
provided to me by Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnolog´ıa (CONACYT), following a se-
ries of telephone and face-to-face interviews with its personnel. It contains information on
6,369 R&D projects that were submitted to Programa de Est´ımulos a la Innovacio´n (PEI)
grants from 2011 to 2013 by 2,845 companies. The dataset provides information on the
project’s sector, a short description of its objective, the subsidy granting decision (whether
it got the PEI subsidy or not), cosponsoring status (with a university o research center),
and the grade assigned by the evaluators. Apart from data on the project itself, CONA-
CYT provided information on the companies that submitted the project. Among others, the
firm name, address, size and sector. The PEI dataset is not publicly available, and, that I
16Detailed information on the PEI progam can be found in CONACYT (2013).
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know of, it has not been previously used for impact evaluation purposes. The second main
dataset I use in this research comes from the 2014 Economic Census collected by Instituto
Nacional de Estad´ıstica y Geograf´ıa (INEGI). The census datasets can be accessed by au-
thorized researchers at INEGI’s Microdata Laboratory. It gathers information on companies
performing economic activities in Mexico that can be located on a fixed address. It contains
information on a wide set of firm economic activities including labor, expenditures, income,
output, assets, debts, research and development, among many others. I get the outcome
variables from the census.
Data on the PEI dataset is provided yearly. However, the census is gathered every five
years. The economic census released on year 2014 contains information that corresponds
to activities performed on year 2013. The census prior to that was released on 2009 (with
information corresponding to year 2008). Hence, 2013 is the only year in the PEI dataset
that I can merge with its corresponding census year. However, I also merge PEI companies
that submitted projects in 2011 and 2012 to this census for three reasons: First, PEI subsi-
dies may have a lasting effect on firm outcomes. Second, some questions in the 2013 census
are posed for activities performed in 2011 and 2012. Third, including 2011 and 2012 firms
increases the number of observations and thus the precision of my estimates.17
The PEI and the census datasets do not count with a common code that uniquely iden-
tifies the firms in both datasets. Hence, to merge the firms across the two sets of data,
I can only use a few identifying variables present in both: the firm’s name, address and
17It is of interest to present a brief description of Mexico’s economic context on year 2013. GDP growth
entered a slight stagnation, but it still grew at a positive rate of 1.1 percent. Growth in years 2011 and 2012
showed a rate of 4.0 and 3.9 respectively. Investment on year 2013 did show a contraction of -1.8 percent,
which mostly came from a decrease in public sector investment. However, industrial production grew at
a positive rate of 0.7 percent. Employment grew by 2.9 percent compared to the previous year. Average
salaries grew as well by 4 percent. The inflation rate showed a moderate growth of 3.9 percent. Thus, even
if Mexico’s economy showed a slight decrease in the growth rate in 2013 compared to previous years, it was
not a particularly atypical year in terms of the evolution of the Mexican economy, as most relevant economic
indicators showed positive growth rates. More information on Mexico’s economic context on year 2013 can
be found in SHCP (2013) and SHCP (2014).
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sector. Merging firms this way bears some complications. Among others, spelling mistakes
are common in both datasets. I follow a special algorithm to merge the firms.18 With this
algorithm, I successfully merge 1,360 firms. This is only around 50 percent of the total
companies that submitted a project to the PEI subsidy in the 2011 to 2013 period. This
may be problematic as the merged company sample might be systematically different to the
original PEI dataset. This dataset does not contain many statistics to compare the merged
versus non-merged firms. However, in Table 1 I show some firm characteristics that provide
a general view of the type of firms I loose in the merging process. The table shows the num-
ber of firms in the PEI dataset by year, as well as the number of firms merged to the 2014
Economic Census. The share of firms receiving the subsidy is regularly around 25 percent of
those that submitted projects to PEI. This share remains similar in the sample of firms that
I merge to the census. However, regarding company size, I loose relatively more small firms
than large firms in the merging process. Small firms in the PEI dataset represent around
70 percent of all submitters, but they compose only around 50 percent of the firms in the
merged sample. I argue that this does not pose a problem to my identification strategy as
long as the firms in the merged sample remain similar across the 75-point threshold and do
not show evidence of bunching across the cut-off. Evidence of this is presented in Section 5.
4.2 Methodology
The objective of this research is to find if the Programa de Est´ımulos a la Innovacio´n (PEI)
R&D subsidy has an impact on a series of firm outcomes related to R&D activities. Consider
the following basic econometric model:
Yi = α + βSi + i (1)
where Yi is the outcome for firm i, Si is a variable equal to one if firm i receives the sub-
sidy and zero otherwise, and i is a random error. In equation (1), β represents the effect of
18A detailed description of the algorithm is provided in Appendix A.
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receiving the PEI subsidy on the outcome. However, as awards are not randomly allocated, if
I estimate equation (1) by ordinary least squares (OLS), parameter β is likely to be biased as
awarded and non-awarded firms can differ on unobserved characteristics correlated with out-
come Yi. For instance, if the outcome is patent registrations, we can suppose that firms that
have higher propensity to register patents also have higher expertise in submitting projects
to public R&D funds, and are more likely to receive the subsidy. In such case, β would be
biased upwards, i.e. its estimated value from equation (1) would be higher than its true value.
To face this problem, I take advantage of the rules that define the PEI granting decision.
As described above, all projects submitted to the PEI subsidy are graded on a 0 to 110 scale.
Projects with grades of 75/110 points or higher are passed to a CONACYT committee that
decides which projects receive the subsidy. Projects with grades lower than 75 points are
not passed to the committee and hence do not receive the PEI grant. This granting scheme
allows to use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) approach similar to that taken by
Bronzini and Iachini (2014) in their study on Italian R&D subsidies. This approach assumes
that assignment to treatment is random close to the threshold, so the average treatment
effect (ATE) can be assessed with the estimated value of the discontinuity at the threshold.
Bronzini and Iachini (2014) use a sharp RDD approach, as in the Italian rules all projects
graded above the threshold get the grant, and no project below the threshold is granted,
i.e. the granting decision is determined solely by the grade. PEI’s granting rules are dif-
ferent: no projects below the grade threshold are awarded, but not all the projects graded
75 or more get the subsidy. The granting decision for projects graded above the threshold
is not clearly outlined in the PEI rules. In order to decide which projects get the subsidy,
the committee might take into account other considerations in addition to the project grade,
such as, company size or reputation, prioritized industrial sectors, CONACYT’s own funding
availability, among others. Treatment is only partially determined by the project grade at
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the grade cut-off. So, the probability to receive the subsidy does not go from zero to one as
the project crosses the 75-grade threshold. To handle this setting, I use the fuzzy regression
discontinuity framework outlined in Angrist and Lavy (1999), Van Der Klaauw (2003) or
Berlinski et al. (2011). The estimation of the treatment effect in fuzzy RDD is done by the
two-stage least squares (2SLS) method. In the first stage, I estimate a predicted value of
subsidy reception Sˆi that depends on the grade. In the second stage, I use Sˆi to estimate
the impact of the PEI subsidy on a series of outcomes.19
Let me now describe with more precision my estimation approach. As mentioned before,
one company could submit more than one project to PEI in the same year. Define Gij =
gradeij − 75, where gradeij is the grade given to project j submitted by company i. A
project j is passed to the committee if Gij ≥ 0. However, we are interested on outcomes at
the company –and not the project– level. To aggregate the grade at the company level, I
take the mean grade of all projects submitted by company i, and I define Gi as company i’s
mean grade.20 In the sharp RDD approach, the average treatment effect (ATE) is estimated
with the discontinuity at the threshold:
19To see a detailed description of the regression discontinuity method, see Jacob et al. (2012) or Cattaneo
et al. (2019).
20The criteria to aggregate the grade by firm is not straightforward. Instead of the mean, I could take the
firm’s maximum project grade. However, the maximum grade pushes most subsidy receiving firms far from
the grade threshold, leaving a small discontinuity jump at the cut-off to do the RDD estimations (in Table B1
of Appendix B, I present estimations I obtain with the maximum grade aggregation criterion). A drawback
of taking the mean grade might be that it pushes many subsidy receiving firms below the threshold. This
would be problematic in a sharp RDD approach. However, fuzzy RDD assumes that the rating variable (the
grade) is not the only one that determines assignment to treatment in either side of the threshold. Thus,
having treated firms below the threshold does not invalidate my estimates. Furthermore, my decision to
take the fuzzy RDD approach is not the result of the mean grade aggregation criterion. If I had used the
maximum grade, I would still have had to use fuzzy RDD, as not all firms above the threshold are treated. So,
I prefer to use the mean grade since it provides a higher discontinuity at the threshold that I can use to get
more precise estimates. In Figure B2, I present the mean granted subsidy by firm mean grade ranges. The
figure shows that the highest grades get higher mean subsidies. However, there are no big jumps in subsidy
amounts at the threshold that could drive the results I get in my estimations. An additional approach to do
the estimations could be to only use the firms that submitted one project. However, the number of firms
that fall into this category is too small to provide significant estimates with fuzzy RDD.
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Yi = α + βSi + (1− Si)
P∑
p=1
γ(Gi)
p + Si
P∑
p=1
γ(Gi)
p + i (2)
where β gives the value of the discontinuity and a set of P-order polynomials are included
to account for non linear relations between the grade and the outcome variables.21 However,
as mentioned above, subsidy reception is not entirely determined by the grade. So, as is
standard in the fuzzy RDD literature, I follow a 2SLS approach, where I instrument subsidy
reception Si with variable Ti, which is defined as:
Ti =
1, if Gi ≥ 00, otherwise (3)
i.e. Ti = 1 if the mean of all the projects submitted to PEI by firm i in a given year is
higher or equal to 75. In the first stage I estimate the following equation:
Sˆi = κ+ λTi + (1− Ti)
P∑
p=1
µ(Gi)
p + Ti
P∑
p=1
µ(Gi)
p + ν (4)
From equation (4), I get a predicted subsidy reception value Sˆi that depends on the grade
and on a set of P-order polynomials. In the second stage I use Sˆi to estimate the causal
impact of the PEI subsidy in a series of R&D outcomes:
Yi = α + βSˆi + (1− Si)
P∑
p=1
γ(Gi)
p + Si
P∑
p=1
γ(Gi)
p + i (5)
I test different P-order polynomials in both stages. In addition, I estimate the 2SLS
equations using both the parametric and the non-parametric approach that is common in
the literature. For the parametric approach, which involves trying polynomial functions of
different orders to find the best model suited to the data, I use all observations in the sample
of merged firms and estimate equations (4) and (5) with up to five-order polynomials. For
21Sharp RDD estimates from equation (2) are presented in Table B2 of Appendix B. The table shows that
all estimates are positive and statistically significant. However, they are prone to the endogeneity problems
mentioned above.
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the non-parametric approach, which involves trying different bandwidths within which the
functional form can be approximated with a linear function, I restrict observations to two
different sample windows of ±30 and ±15 points around the cut-off, and use up to two-order
polynomials. The wide window includes 85 percent of the baseline sample. The narrow
window includes 60 percent of the baseline sample. I do not restrict the sample further
by getting closer to the cut-off since the power to detect effects in fuzzy RDD designs is
considerably lower than that of sharp RDD, let alone a comparable randomized trial.22
In addition, for β to identify a casual effect of the PEI subsidy, Ti must not be correlated
with the outcome (cov(Ti, i) = 0). Correlation could take place if companies had a way to
influence the grade around the 75-grade cut-off. For instance, firms that carry-out more R&D
activities might have more experience applying to the PEI funds. If these firms have learned
ways to influence the evaluators grading decisions, for instance, by submitting projects in
a way they know will be more favourably graded, the grade would be endogenous and my
estimation approach would be invalid. This concern is partially solved by the fact that the
75-grade rule, and the guidelines to submit and grade the projects, are announced to all ap-
plying firms. In addition, the projects are graded by three different evaluators that are not
announced to the applying firms, which makes influencing all their decisions harder. In any
case, I address these concerns empirically by verifying the smoothness of Gi through visual
inspection and by performing tests to evaluate bunching around the cut-off. In addition, I
verify if firms below and above the threshold are similar in characteristics not related to the
22In RDD estimation, the design effect 1
1−R2T
, is the size that a RDD sample must have to get the power
of a comparable randomized control trial (RCT). R2T represents how the rating variable, in this case, the
grade, is distributed around the cut-off. For normal distributions R2T ≈ 0.64. So, in a sharp RDD, the
sample size should be 1
1−R2T
≈ 2.75 times larger to get estimates as precise as in a comparable RCT. For
fuzzy RDD, the design effect is 1
(1−R2T )(pt−pc)2
, where pt is the show rate, i.e. firms above the threshold that
get the treatment, and pc is the cross-over rate: firms below the threshold that get the treatment. In this
case pt ≈ 0.70 and pc ≈ 0.10. So the design effect is 1(1−R2T )(pt−pc)2 ≈ 7.72. My sample size should be around
eight times larger than that of a comparable RCT to get similar precision on the estimates. This limitations
of the fuzzy RDD come to light when I restrict the windows to less than 15 points around the threshold. In
Table B3, I show results of equation (5) with a 10-point window around the threshold. Coefficients with this
window are not significant for any outcome.
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grading decision. They should differ only on the PEI subsidy reception rates. I present these
tests in Section 5.
The PEI subsidy specifically grants money for the following factors associated to the sub-
mitted R&D project: wages of people working on the project, designs and prototypes, patents
and intellectual property, operation costs of the project, equipment for the research labo-
ratory and laboratory improvements. Hence, I evaluate as outcomes: 1) personnel working
on innovation activities, 2) personnel working on research activities, 3) patenting activities,
and 4) private R&D spending.
5 Results
I start by showing evidence that supports my estimation approach. First, I address concerns
about bunching around the 75-point threshold. Presence of bunching could mean that some
firms can push evaluators to grade them just above the threshold. These firms could have
characteristics that are correlated with the outcomes. Figure 1 shows the density of the
firm’s average project grade (where zero represents the 75-point cut-off). I include all firms
that submitted projects to the Programa de Est´ımulos a Innovacio´n (PEI) R&D subsidy
from 2011 to 2013 that I could merge to the 2014 Economic Census databases. In the figure,
we can observe that the density is higher above the subsidy granting threshold. However,
we do not observe high drops just below or above the threshold that could invalidate my
estimation strategy.23 I also test firm balance around the cut-off. As mentioned above, if
assignment to treatment is random close to the threshold, there should be no systematic dif-
ferences between firms around the grade cut-off. In Table 2, I show means of variables that
23Visual inspection might not be enough to confirm bunching, so, in addition, I perform a test proposed
by Cattaneo et al. (2016). The null hypothesis is that there is no manipulation of the density at the cut-off.
The associated p-value to the test’s T statistic is 0.653. This means that I fail to reject the null hypothesis
and there is no statistical evidence of manipulation at the cut-off. In addition, in Figure B1 I show the
density grade of each of the projects submitted to the PEI subsidy. The figure shows a similar density as
that of the firm mean project grade. The density is higher above the threshold but we do not observe high
drops above or below the cut-off
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are not related to treatment for firms below and above the grade threshold. The table shows
that means are not statistically different below and above the cut-off for the two sample
windows.24 Furthermore, to support my identification strategy, I must show that the score
variable (Gi) displays a discontinuity at the cut-off. That is, if firms with average project
grades above the 75-point threshold have higher chances of receiving the PEI subsidy. Figure
2 shows that there is indeed a jump at the 75-point threshold. Since Gi is defined as the firm
mean grade, subsidy reception below the threshold is positive, even as no projects below the
threshold receive the subsidy. Nevertheless, firm average grades above the cut-off are clearly
associated with higher subsidy reception shares. Hence, the empirical tests provide support
for my identification strategy, allowing us to move to examine the impact of the PEI subsidy
on the outcomes.
First, I show the effect of the PEI subsidy on innovation personnel. I measure this out-
come with a question in the census that asks companies if they had personnel working on
innovation activities on year 2013. Firms can respond either “Yes” (= 1) or “No” (= 0). In
the census, innovation is defined as the introduction of new or significantly improved products
(goods or services) or processes (including production methods) into the market. Innovation
may come from well defined projects, or from routine improvements, spontaneous ideas or
other non-systematic factors. Figure 3 plots the firms that submitted a project to the PEI
program from 2011 to 2013 (merged to the Economic Census data) and responded the in-
novation personnel question. The figure shows a discontinuity above the 75-point threshold.
This leads to think that the PEI subsidy leads firms to have more people doing innovation
activities.25 However, to confirm the statistical significance of this visual inspection, we must
24In addition, in Figure B3 of Appendix B, I show bin averages by grade for these non-related to treatment
outcomes (normalized by production value), to visually examine if there are any jumps at the cut-off. The
figure shows no such jumps.
25As mentioned before, observations below the cut-off consist of firms that receive treatment as well as
others that do not receive it. The same is true for observations above the cut-off. Comparing these units has
a limited causal interpretation. Jacob et al. (2012) indicate that in fuzzy RDD designs “the treatment effect
can be recovered by dividing the jump in the outcome-rating relationship by the jump in the relationship
between treatment status and rating” (p. 66). This is the local average treatment effect (LATE), i.e. the
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examine the estimates of the impact of the PEI subsidy: β from equation (5). A positive
value of coefficient β would mean that the subsidy leads companies to allocate more people
to innovation activities, on average. In Table 3, I show the β estimates under different order
polynomials and windows around the cut-off. Note that, most estimates for β are positive
(only one is negative). Also, several estimates are statistically significant by at least a 99
percent confidence level and the coefficient’s magnitudes are not small. Regressions for the
complete sample of firms, show statistically significant estimates for the all polynomial or-
ders. However, as I restrict the sample to firms closer to the cut-off, estimates of β are
significant for the two order polynomial, but not for the one order. Authors such as Gelman
and Imbens (2014) give reasons why researchers should prefer lower order polynomials in
RDD analysis. One which is highly relevant in this case is that higher order polynomials
give large weights to observations that are far from the threshold. In Figure 3, we see bins
that take large values at lower grades. This is due to the fewer observations I have at these
scores (see Figure 1). Higher-order polynomials give large weights to these observations. So,
my preferred β estimates are those of lower order polynomials. As, I get significant results
for the two order polynomial, but not for the one order, I cannot conclusively state that the
PEI subsidy does lead firms to perform more innovation activities. Still, visual inspection
of Figure 3 and estimates on Table 3 suggest that this could well be the case. This would
mean that the PEI subsidy leads to increase personnel dedicated to innovation activities by
a considerable magnitude, of around 0.4 points in a 0 to 1 scale.26
impact of the PEI program on the group of firms that are above the cut-off and actually received the subsidy
compared to those below the cut-off that did not receive the subsidy. The outcome-rating jump can be
recovered from Figure 3 at about 0.1. The treatment status-rating jump is seen in Figure 2 at about 0.26.
Hence, apparently, the PEI subsidy leads to an increase of around 0.38 points in firms having innovation
personnel (on a scale from zero to one).
26Concerning what type of firms are behind the PEI positive impact on innovation activities. Figure B5
suggests that it is larger firms which are impacted the most. The figure shows that there is a discrete jump
at the threshold for large firms. It shows as well that there is no clear discontinuity when we focus on small
firms. However, the coefficient estimates in Table B4 do not confirm this visual observation as they are
mostly statistically insignificant for large firms as well as for small firms. The driving force of this lack of
significance might be that the sample of firms is small when I divide them by size. It is specially tiny for
small firms, as they do not respond often to the question on innovation activities in the census. In addition,
in Figure B4 I present the average subsidy reception by grade and by company size.
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I am also interested in finding out if the PEI subsidy has an impact on research activ-
ities. These are defined in the census as the systematic theoretical and experimental work
leading to the increase of knowledge, resulting in the creation of new or significantly im-
proved products or processes. I show results for the research personnel outcome in Figure
4 and Table 4. Figure 4 shows a discontinuity for this outcome as well. However, bins
have a less clear pattern than for the innovation result. This lack of clarity is confirmed in
the regression estimates of Table 4. There, we see that most estimates are not statistically
significant for at least a 95 percent level. In the full sample, only one of the polynomial
orders is significant above that level. In both the wide and narrow sample windows, I get
significant estimates for the two order polynomial, but the polynomial of order one remains
not precise. Hence, estimates do not seem to support the PEI subsidy having an impact on
personnel allocated to research. Note that research, as defined in the census, demands more
commitment to R&D activities than innovation. Research implies always systematic work,
whereas innovation may come from routine work, spontaneous ideas or other non-systematic
R&D activities. This suggests that the PEI subsidy may increase private R&D, but not by
increasing a lasting research production.
I also examine if the PEI subsidy has an effect on patents. Figure 5 plots firm patent-
ing activities (measured as registration or acquisition of patents) by firm mean grade. The
discontinuity for this outcome is even less clear the one for research personnel. Indeed, es-
timates in Table 5 show that the regression results for this outcome are not precise. In the
wide sample window, I get a positive and significant estimate for the two-order polynomial
but not for the one-order. In the narrow window, I do not get statistically significance
for any of the polynomials. Thus, the PEI subsidy does not appear to have an impact on
patents. This suggests that the subsidy does not have an effect on the actual introduction
of new patented products or processes into the market. More personnel dedicated to innova-
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tion combined with no changes in patenting could signal fruitless increased innovation efforts.
Finally, I analyse if the PEI grants led companies to increase their private R&D spend-
ing. The aim is to inspect if granted firm’s (compared to non-granted) invest more of their
own money, in addition to the PEI grants they receive. Figure 6 plots average private R&D
expenditures (normalized by production value) by average firm grade. A discontinuity in
this graph would indicate that firms awarded with the PEI subsidy increase their own in-
vestment on R&D in addition to the subsidies received. Figure 6 however, shows no such
discontinuity. Regressions in Table 6 confirm that there is no statistically significant effect
on this outcome. My inability to detect a statistically significant effect on private R&D
expenditures may come from the few observations I have on this variable. Nevertheless, the
evidence leads to arguing that any extra innovation personnel that might be induced by the
PEI subsidy is not financed with additional firm own resources, but with the PEI grants
themselves. The lack of effect of the PEI subsidy on private R&D spending means that, on
average, granted firms would continue to carry out their planned private R&D spending if
they had not received the PEI grant.
To sum up, of the outcomes I analyse, the sole where my estimates suggest a positive
impact from PEI, is personnel working on innovation activities. My estimates imply that
there is no impact on research personnel, patenting activities or private R&D spending.
Innovation, as defined in the Economic Census, is the weakest of the R&D outcomes I
measure. As mentioned above, innovation may come from well defined projects, but also from
non-systematic work. As opposed to research, which is defined as systematic work leading
to the increase of knowledge. It it puzzling that I arrive to this finding, since CONACYT
required companies to submit well defined R&D projects so they could be considered as
candidates to the PEI grants. One explanation to this finding could be the fact that my
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estimates rely heavily on the larger firms that applied to the PEI subsidies.27 Probably,
large firms see the PEI grants as a cheaper source for financing their R&D projects than the
capital market. However, in case of missing public support, they still carry-out their planned
R&D projects. If they are awarded with the grants, the firms seem to use the extra funds
to allocate more personnel to existing projects, rather than to get new ones started. This
process does not seem to result on increased patenting.
6 Conclusion
The estimates obtained in this research suggest that the PEI subsidy did not have statisti-
cally significant positive effects on most outcomes. The subsidy seems to positively impact
innovation personnel, but not stronger measures of R&D activities, such as research per-
sonnel, patenting or private R&D expenditures. My findings differ from those of numerous
studies on R&D subsidies to private firms in high income countries. Those studies find strong
positive effects of public grants on private R&D. My inability to find positive and significant
estimates for most outcomes may be due to the fact that my sample is heavily composed by
large firms. Research by Lach (2002), Gonza´lez et al. (2005), O¨zc¸elik and Taymaz (2008)
and Bronzini and Iachini (2014) finds that it is smaller firms that tend to be more posi-
tively impacted by public R&D subsidies. Nonetheless, the lack of significant effects in my
estimates may be due to fact that private firms in Mexico do not translate efficiently more
R&D resources into increased R&D activity. As previously mentioned, the context of firms
in economies far from the technology frontier is different than that of high income countries.
More research in middle and low income countries is needed to understand structural reasons
that explain my findings.
Concerning the government decision to cancel the PEI subsidy. First, I find no comple-
27As mentioned in Section 4.1, I could not merge to the Economic Census many of the small firms that
applied to the PEI subsidy. In addition, many of those small firms that I could merge do not count with
R&D information in the census.
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mentary or crowding-out effects on private R&D spending, so I do not expect private R&D
spending to decrease as consequence of the PEI program elimination. However, total R&D
expenditure will decease if the funds previously assigned to PEI are not used for R&D activ-
ities in different entities. Moreover, since my estimates do not suggest that the PEI subsidy
had an impact in the most meaningful measures of R&D, arguably public R&D funds could
be invested in entities –research centres, universities, public companies, among others– that
may be more positively impacted by R&D grants. However, this research cannot assert if,
indeed, any of those entities will be more o less positively impacted by public R&D funds
than private firms.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of firms in the database
All Firms that Submitted a Project to the PEI
Subsidy from 2011 to 2013
Year Total Recevied Grant Company size
No Yes Small Large
2011 1426 1040 386 856 570
72.9% 27.1% 60.0% 40.0%
2012 713 548 165 504 209
76.9% 23.1% 70.7% 29.3%
2013 706 510 196 550 156
72.2% 27.8% 77.9% 22.1%
Total 2845 2098 747 1910 935
73.7% 26.3% 67.1% 32.9%
Firms that were Merged to the 2014
Economic Census
Year Total Received grant Company size
No Yes Small Large
2011 802 571 231 349 453
71.2% 28.8% 43.5% 56.5%
2012 304 229 75 149 155
75.3% 24.7% 49.0% 51.0%
2013 255 184 71 146 109
72.2% 27.8% 57.3% 42.7%
Total 1361 984 377 644 717
72.3% 27.7% 47.3% 52.7%
Note: This table shows descriptive statistics on the firms that
submitted a project to the PEI subsidy in the 2011 to 2013
period.
Sources: CONACYT’s PEI database and INEGI’s 2014 Eco-
nomic Census.
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Table 2: Means of variables unrelated to treatment
± 30 points ± 15 points
Below Above Below Above
cut-off cut-off cut-off cut-off
Production value Mean 686,007 780,469 667,241 700,277
SD 1,122,798 1,179,680 1,179,321 1,107,698
Total assets Mean 112,372 118,139 116,626 107,555
SD 224,529 245,595 238,524 225,067
Real state assets Mean 65,479 75,892 68,683 66,846
SD 117,300 139,320 129,396 127,671
Sales Mean 411,492 457,749 354,319 431,711
SD 794,169 820,072 700,682 778,156
Total expenditures Mean 273,984 324,678 238,010 303,908
SD 572,730 635,200 485,586 598,324
Financial expenditures Mean 11,920 13,333 11,594 13,126
SD 24,784 27,633 25,600 27,917
Paid taxes Mean 11,213 10,769 8,542 12,208
SD 22,780 24,230 18,157 26,308
Paid Soc. Sec. Contributions Mean 6,002 5,816 6,325 5,839
SD 11,663 10,229 12,420 10,187
Note: This table shows means of variables unrelated to treatment for firms below and above the
75-point threshold.
*** Statistically significant difference at the 1 percent confidence level.
** Statistically significant difference at the 5 percent confidence level.
* Statistically significant difference at the 10 percent confidence level.
Sources: CONACYT’s PEI database and INEGI’s 2014 Economic Census.
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Table 3: Effect of the PEI subsidy on innovation personnel
Outcome: Was there personnel working on innovation
activities in 2013? (Yes=1, No=0)
Full Sample ± 30 points ± 15 points
Polynomial order
One 0.193*** 0.112 -0.017
(0.072) (0.139) (0.275)
0.051 - 0.334 -0.160 - 0.385 -0.556 - 0.522
Two 0.400*** 0.428*** 0.659***
(0.129) (0.161) (0.225)
0.147 - 0.653 0.113 - 0.743 0.218 - 1.100
Three 0.536***
(0.145)
0.252 - 0.819
Four 0.475***
(0.175)
0.132 - 0.817
Five 0.525***
(0.189)
0.154 - 0.897
Observations 1,207 1,070 761
Note: This table shows β estimates from equation (5). I include firms
that submitted a project to the PEI program from 2011 to 2013 that
I merged to the 2014 Economic Census. Standard errors shown in
brackets. Confidence intervals shown below standard errors. Stars
show significance at the ***1%, **5% and *10% level.
Sources: CONACYT’s PEI database and INEGI’s 2014 Economic
Census.
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Table 4: Effect of the PEI subsidy on research personnel
Outcome: Was there personnel working on research
activities in 2013? (Yes=1, No=0)
Full Sample ± 30 points ± 15 points
Polynomial order
One 0.181* -0.007 -0.073
(0.101) (0.205) (0.418)
-0.018 - 0.379 -0.410 - 0.396 -0.893 - 0.748
Two 0.331* 0.479** 0.817**
(0.179) (0.225) (0.321)
-0.021 - 0.682 0.038 - 0.921 0.186 - 1.447
Three 0.675***
(0.197)
0.288 - 1.063
Four 0.434*
(0.234)
-0.026 - 0.894
Five 0.386
(0.295)
-0.192 - 0.964
Observations 1,207 1,070 761
Note: This table shows β estimates from equation (5). I include firms
that submitted a project to the PEI program from 2011 to 2013 that
I merged to the 2014 Economic Census. Standard errors shown in
brackets. Confidence intervals shown below standard errors. Stars
show significance at the ***1%, **5% and *10% level.
Sources: CONACYT’s PEI database and INEGI’s 2014 Economic
Census.
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Table 5: Effect of the PEI subsidy on patenting activities
Outcome: Did the firm register or acquire
patents in 2013? (Yes=1, No=0)
Full Sample ± 30 points ± 15 points
Polynomial order
One 0.099 0.182 -0.018
(0.086) (0.181) (0.345)
-0.070 - 0.268 -0.174 - 0.538 -0.695 - 0.659
Two 0.158 0.523** 0.291
(0.155) (0.205) (0.275)
-0.146 - 0.462 0.121 - 0.925 -0.249 - 0.830
Three 0.341**
(0.171)
0.007 - 0.676
Four 0.421**
(0.200)
0.028 - 0.815
Five -0.000
(0.256)
-0.502 - 0.502
Observations 1,207 1,070 761
Note: This table shows β estimates from equation (5). I include firms
that submitted a project to the PEI program from 2011 to 2013 that
I merged to the 2014 Economic Census. Standard errors shown in
brackets. Confidence intervals shown below standard errors. Stars
show significance at the ***1%, **5% and *10% level.
Sources: CONACYT’s PEI database and INEGI’s 2014 Economic
Census.
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Table 6: Effect of the PEI subsidy on private R&D spending
Outcome: R&D spending / Production value
Full Sample ± 30 points ± 15 points
Polynomial order
One -0.003 -0.007 0.012
(0.005) (0.010) (0.023)
-0.014 - 0.008 -0.026 - 0.013 -0.032 - 0.057
Two 0.008 -0.005 0.029*
(0.010) (0.012) (0.015)
-0.012 - 0.027 -0.028 - 0.018 -0.000 - 0.058
Three 0.015
(0.011)
-0.007 - 0.037
Four -0.003
(0.012)
-0.027 - 0.021
Five 0.014
(0.017)
-0.020 - 0.047
Observations 312 278 199
Note: This table shows β estimates from equation (5). I include firms
that submitted a project to the PEI program from 2011 to 2013 that
I merged to the 2014 Economic Census. Standard errors shown in
brackets. Confidence intervals shown below standard errors. Stars
show significance at the ***1%, **5% and *10% level.
Sources: CONACYT’s PEI database and INEGI’s 2014 Economic
Census.
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Figures
Figure 1: Distribution of firm average grades
Note: This figure shows the density distribution of the firm average project grade. I include firms that
submitted a project to the PEI program from 2011 to 2013 that I merged to the 2014 Economic Census
databases.
Sources: CONACYT’s PEI database and INEGI’s 2014 Economic Census
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Figure 2: Share of firms that received the PEI subsidy
Note: This figure plots average subsidy reception by firm mean grade. I include firms that submitted a
project to the PEI program from 2011 to 2013 that I merged to the 2014 Economic Census.
Sources: CONACYT’s PEI database and INEGI’s 2014 Economic Census
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Figure 3: Share of firms with innovation personnel
Note: This figure plots the average share of firms with personnel dedicated to innovation activities by firm
mean grade. I include firms that submitted a project to the PEI program from 2011 to 2013 that I merged
to the 2014 Economic Census.
Sources: CONACYT’s PEI database and INEGI’s 2014 Economic Census
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Figure 4: Share of firms with research personnel
Note: This figure plots the average share of firms with personnel dedicated to research activities by firm
mean grade. I include firms that submitted a project to the PEI program from 2011 to 2013 that I merged
to the 2014 Economic Census.
Sources: CONACYT’s PEI database and INEGI’s 2014 Economic Census
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Figure 5: Share of firms performing patenting activities
Note: This figure plots the average share of firms that performed patenting activities by firm mean grade. I
include firms that submitted a project to the PEI program from 2011 to 2013 that I successfully merged to
the 2014 Economic Census.
Sources: CONACYT’s PEI database and INEGI’s 2014 Economic Census
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Figure 6: Private R&D spending
Note: This figure plots average private expenditure in R&D activities (normalized by production value) by
firm mean grade. I include firms that submitted a project to the PEI program from 2011 to 2013 that I
successfully merged to the 2014 Economic Census.
Sources: CONACYT’s PEI database and INEGI’s 2014 Economic Census
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A Merging Datasets
I merge two sets of data. The first set is provided by Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tec-
nolog´ıa (CONACYT) and includes all firms that submitted a project to the Programa de
Est´ımulos a la Innovacio´n (PEI) subsidy from 2011 to 2013. The second set is the 2014
Economic Census collected by Instituto Nacional de Geograf´ıa y Estad´ıstica (INEGI). The
census contains many firm identifying variables, such as firm name, address, economic sec-
tor, size, employees, among others. CONACYT provided as well information on four firm
identifiers: formal name, address, economic sector and firm size. I use these four variables
to merge the firms in the PEI database to the economic census datasets.
Before I do the merging, I standardize company names in both datasets. First I substi-
tute all letters with an accent, such as “a´” with the same letter without the accent (“a”).
I also substitute “n˜” by “n”. Then, I drop all special characters such as “&”, “%”, “-”,
etc. In addition, I drop all dots, commas, punctuation marks and blank spaces that are not
between words. I also convert all letters to upper case. Finally, I drop all acronyms that
denote the firm legal status, such as “SA DE CV”, “SC DE RL”, “AC”, among many others.
Once names in both datasets are standardized, I use the company name, address and
sector to merge the firms. First I use the formal name. If I do not find an exact match with
the formal name, I use the name shown at the establishment. If I do not find a match with
the formal and establishment name within the State, I move to the other States until I find
a match with either the formal or establishment name. The economic census dataset con-
tains a registry of physical establishments. Since one firm can own many establishments and
have them registered under the same name, merging by name can bring many establishment
matches for the same firm in the PEI dataset. When this happens, I keep the establishment
with the highest number of employees, given that the sector and address are also matched.
There are many instances in which I cannot get an exact match using names. Com-
pany names might be misspelled in one, or both, datasets. For instance, instead of a
correct company name such as “EMPRESAS INNOVADORAS MEXICANAS”, I could
have “EMPRESA INNOVADORAS MEXICANAS”, “EMPRESAS INNOV MEXICANAS”,
“EMPRESAS INNOV MEX”, among many other variants. To face this matter, I use the
recklink2 Stata command.28 The command uses probabilistic matching and throws a set of
likely matches ranked by a score. For those firms that I could not get an exact name match,
28For detailed information on this Stata command see Wasi and Flaaen (2015).
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I use this probabilistic matching. I follow the same process described above, i.e. merging
by name, address and sector. This process brings many probable matches for one firm. For
each firm, I check its probable matches one by one and select the one I think is the best
based on the name, address sector and firm size.
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B Additional Tables and Graphs
Table B1: Estimates with the maximum grade as aggregation criterion
Outcome: Was there personnel working in innovation
activities in 2013? (Yes=1, No=0)
Full Sample ± 30 points ± 15 points
Polynomial order
One 0.391** 0.157 0.106
(0.158) (0.116) (0.159)
0.082 - 0.700 -0.070 - 0.385 -0.206 - 0.417
Two 0.129 0.171 -0.196
(0.265) (0.275) (0.487)
-0.390 - 0.648 -0.369 - 0.711 -1.153 - 0.761
Three -0.179
(0.579)
-1.315 - 0.957
Four -0.468
(0.843)
-2.123 - 1.187
Five -0.619
(0.757)
-2.104 - 0.866
Observations 1,207 1,070 761
Note: This table shows β estimates from equation (5) when I ag-
gregate the firm grade using the maximum grade obtained in all its
submitted projects. I include firms that submitted a project to the PEI
program from 2011 to 2013 that I merged to the 2014 Economic Cen-
sus. Standard errors shown in brackets. Confidence intervals shown
below standard errors. Stars show significance at the ***1%, **5%
and *10% level.
Sources: CONACYT’s PEI database and INEGI’s 2014 Economic
Census.
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Table B2: Sharp RDD Estimates
Outcome: Was there personnel working in innovation
activities in 2013? (Yes=1, No=0)
Full Sample ± 30 points ± 15 points
Polynomial order
One 0.139*** 0.122*** 0.114**
(0.035) (0.040) (0.047)
0.070 - 0.208 0.044 - 0.200 0.021 - 0.207
Two 0.135*** 0.127*** 0.136**
(0.039) (0.043) (0.056)
0.059 - 0.211 0.042 - 0.212 0.027 - 0.246
Three 0.120***
(0.045)
0.033 - 0.208
Four 0.125**
(0.049)
0.030 - 0.221
Five 0.122**
(0.050)
0.025 - 0.220
Observations 1,207 1,070 761
Note: This table shows β estimates from equation (2). I include firms
that submitted a project to the PEI program from 2011 to 2013 that
I merged to the 2014 Economic Census. Standard errors shown in
brackets. Confidence intervals shown below standard errors. Stars
show significance at the ***1%, **5% and *10% level.
Sources: CONACYT’s PEI database and INEGI’s 2014 Economic
Census.
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Table B3: Estimates with a ±10-point window
Outcomes: Innovation Research Patenting Private RDI
Personnel Personnel Activities Spending
Polynomial order
One 0.397 0.296 0.259 0.016
(0.325) (0.471) (0.408) (0.023)
-0.242 - 1.035 -0.630 - 1.222 -0.542 - 1.060 -0.030 - 0.061
Two 0.041 0.205 0.803 -0.020
(0.506) (0.737) (0.628) (0.034)
-0.952 - 1.034 -1.243 - 1.653 -0.430 - 2.037 -0.088 - 0.048
Observations 523 523 523 140
Note: This table shows β estimates from equation (5) with a window of ±10 points
around the threshold. I include firms that submitted a project to the PEI program from
2011 to 2013 that I merged to the 2014 Economic Census. Standard errors shown in
brackets. Confidence intervals shown below standard errors. Stars show significance at
the ***1%, **5% and *10% level.
Sources: CONACYT’s PEI database and INEGI’s 2014 Economic Census.
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Figure B1: Distribution of project grades
Note: This figure shows the density distribution of project grades. I include projects submitted to the PEI
program from 2011 to 2013 of firms that I merged to the 2014 Economic Census databases.
Sources: CONACYT’s PEI database and INEGI’s 2014 Economic Census
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Figure B2: Mean subsidy amount by grade range
Note: This figure shows mean subsidy granted by ranges of firm mean grade. I include firms that submitted
a project to the PEI program from 2011 to 2013 that I merged to the 2014 Economic Census databases.
Sources: CONACYT’s PEI database and INEGI’s 2014 Economic Census
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Figure B3: Variables non-related to treatment
Note: This figure plots outcomes non-related to treatment by mean firm grade. I include firms that submitted
a project to the PEI program from 2011 to 2013 that I merged to the 2014 Economic Census.
Sources: CONACYT’s PEI database and INEGI’s 2014 Economic Census
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Figure B4: Share of firms that received the PEI subsidy by firm size
(a) Large firms
(b) Small firms
Note: This figure plots average subsidy reception by firm mean grade and by firm size. I include firms that
submitted a project to the PEI program from 2011 to 2013 that I merged to the 2014 Economic Census.
Sources: CONACYT’s PEI database and INEGI’s 2014 Economic Census
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Figure B5: Share of firms with innovation personnel by firm size
(a) Large firms
(b) Small firms
Note: This figure the average share of firms with personnel dedicated to innovation activities by firm mean
grade and by firm size. I include firms that submitted a project to the PEI program from 2011 to 2013 that
I merged to the 2014 Economic Census.
Sources: CONACYT’s PEI database and INEGI’s 2014 Economic Census
49
